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CROSS-LISTING, PRICE DISCOVERY AND 
THE INFORMATIVENESS OF THE TRADING PROCESS 
 




This paper analyzes the price discovery process of securities that trade at 
multiple markets with trading sessions that totally or partially overlap. Building on 
Hasbrouck (1995) information share approach, we introduce a methodology that 
distinguishes two sources of information asymmetries between markets: trade-related 
and trade-unrelated informative shocks. This approach determines how much of each 
market’s relative contribution to the price discovery process during the overlapping 
period is attributable to its own trading activity. We provide empirical evidence on the 
contribution of the NYSE in the price discovery process of the Spanish cross-listed 
stocks during the daily two-hour overlapping interval. 




Este trabajo analiza el proceso de formación del precio de acciones negociadas 
en varios mercados con sesiones de negociación total o parcialmente solapadas. A partir 
del modelo propuesto por Hasbrouck (1995), introducimos una metodología que 
distingue dos fuentes de asimetría de información entre los mercados: la inferida a partir 
de la negociación de cada mercado e información ajena a la negociación. El objetivo es 
determinar en qué medida la contribución relativa de cada mercado al proceso de 
formación del precio durante el período de solapamiento es relevante y que parte de esta 
es atribuible a su propia actividad de negociación. Se obtiene evidencia empírica de la 
contribución del NYSE en el proceso de formación del precio de las acciones españolas 
durante el intervalo de dos horas de solapamiento diario. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Negociación en varios mercados, Formación del precio, 
Shocks de negociación, ADRs 1. Introduction 
When an asset is traded at multiple markets, a crucial question naturally arises: 
which market does contribute more to the discovery of the efficient price. In the last 
years, alternative methodological approaches have been proposed to measure these 
relative contributions during intervals when the trading sessions of the different markets 
totally or partially overlap. Harris et al. (1995) use a vector error correction (VEC) 
model to study the adjustment mechanism of the NYSE and regional prices towards the 
common underlying efficient price. A significant error correction term in the NYSE 
price equation indicates that regional markets do contribute to the price discovery of 
NYSE-listed stocks. Hasbrouck (1995) proposes a common trend representation to 
model the NYSE and regional quotes. The fraction of the long-term variance (the 
variance of the common stochastic trend) that is explained by each market innovations 
defines its information share. Hasbrouck finds that the information share of the regional 
markets is relatively unimportant. Finally, Harris et al. (2002) uses the common factor 
estimation method proposed by Gonzalo and Granger (1995) to evaluate each market’s 
proportion of the price discovery. In this methodology the long memory component of 
stock prices is characterized as a weighted average of the contemporaneous trade prices. 
The weights signify the incidence of trades that permanently move prices on each 
market. Their findings show changes in the location of price discovery over time. A 
recent special issue of the Journal of Financial Markets (Vol. 5, No.3) provides some 
discussion on the differences and similarities between these econometric 
methodologies. 
Tse (2000) argues that different data sets (quotes versus trades) rather than 
models or periods matter when measuring relative contributions to price discovery. 
Thus, trades executed on the foreign/regional markets may provide information to 
domestic/home traders even if the economic meaning of the foreign/regional quotes is 
irrelevant. Therefore, a methodology intended to study the price discovery process of 
dually listed stocks should take into account at least both quotes and trades. Current 
methodologies cannot differentiate between alternative sources of information simply 
because the trading activity is not openly modeled. To the extent that a transaction 
conveys useful information, this should be reflected in the quotes of the exchange that is 
first aware of the transaction. Therefore, by decomposing the quote innovations into 
trade-related and trade-unrelated shocks we should be able to determine how much of 
each market’s relative contribution is attributable to its trading activity. In addition, 
existing methodologies provide an incomplete characterization of a dominant-satellite   4
relationship because the trading process of a given market may be informative for the 
other markets even when the quotes are not informative at all. By modeling the trading 
processes of the different markets, we would allow for incremental information 
contained in trade shocks, beyond that reflected in each market’s quotes.  
In this paper, we propose a simplistic theoretical framework for two markets that 
simultaneously trade one stock. Each market forms its sequence of conditional 
expectations about the security’s ultimate value drawing on the revisions of their 
available information set. We consider two possible sources of information asymmetries 
between markets. On the one hand, the presence of informed agents endowed with 
superior information about the true value of the stock. This information, we assume, is 
revealed through trading. Because informed agents must decide where to exploit their 
information advantage (e.g., Chowdhry and Nanda, 1991), trade-related information 
may cause transitory differences in the markets’ expectations about the true value of the 
stock. On the second hand, public announcements, characterized as noisy signals (e.g., 
Harris and Raviv, 1993), may also cause information asymmetries. This trade-unrelated 
information is simultaneously exposed to all markets but they differ in their ability to 
process it (e.g., Kim and Verrecchia, 1994). A given public announcement provides the 
market with superior processing capacity with a temporary advantage over the other 
market. In this context, a pure satellite market has an uninformative trading process and 
is incapable of interpreting public announcements.  
We show that the natural empirical counterpart of our theoretical framework is a 
VEC model that explicitly identifies the informative (unexpected) component of 
trading. Following Hasbrouck (1995), we use the common trend representation of this 
VEC model to measure each market’s trading activity contribution to the long-term 
volatility of the stock (trade-related information shares). We provide empirical evidence 
on the contribution of the NYSE to the price formation of the Spanish stocks that were 
listed in the US market as ADRs during 2000. We center the attention on the daily two-
hour overlapping interval between the NYSE and the Spanish Stock Exchange (SSE). 
For the most frequently traded NYSE-listed Spanish stock, we are unable to 
characterize the NYSE as a pure satellite market of the SSE. Nonetheless, we strongly 
accept the null hypothesis that the NYSE trading activity does not contribute to the 
price discovery of the Spanish ADRs. These findings are robust to alternative 
specifications of the empirical model.     
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the theoretical 
framework. In section 3, we introduce and discuss the empirical model. In section 4, we 
define the information share measures. In section 5, we describe the data set. In section   5
6, we provide the estimation results and the information shares for the NYSE and the 
SSE and discuss some refinements of the empirical analysis. Finally, we conclude in 
section 7.  
2. Motivation 
Consider a stock that trades at two different markets, the home or domestic 
market (D) and an alternative/foreign market (F), with trading sessions that overlap 
during a given time interval. Without any loss of generality, suppose that F closes after 
D. Each market’s information set updates because of trade-related and trade-unrelated 
information shocks. In this simplified world, we equate trade-unrelated shocks and 
public disclosures and trade-related shocks to private information (a strong assumption, 
as discussed in the next section). To start with, consider the case in which public 
disclosures are not noisy signals. The two markets adjust quoted prices at the same time 
and by the same amount after a trade-unrelated shock. Thus, we impose that the unique 
source of information asymmetries between markets is the trade-inferred information. 
Let mt be the expected true value of the stock given the full information set at moment t. 
That is, 
[] t t E m φ ψ τ | = ,          [ 1 ]  
where E[.|.] is the conditional expectation, ψ τ  is the true value of the stock in a future 
reference moment τ  (for example, the end of trading at F) and φ t is the total information 
available, both common and uncommon to both markets, at moment t. We assume that 
this information is fully inferred from the time series of quotes and trades. The common 
information set (
C
t φ ) includes the current and all previous trade-unrelated shocks and 
the whole history of trade-related shocks up to period t-1. Since informed agents must 
decide where to exploit their information advantage, the trade-related information might 
be revealed earlier either at market D (
D
t φ ) or at market F (
F
t φ ). Under this structure, 






t t φ φ φ φ = . Given that, at some point in time, the information sets 
available for markets D and F may differ, their expectations about ψ τ  may also be 







t E m φ φ ψ τ , | = , i={D,  F}.          [2]   6




t w m m λ + =
* ,            [ 3 ]  
where 
*
t m  represents the expected true value of the stock when only the common 
information set is available, that is  [ ]
C
t t E m φ ψ τ |
* =  . The stochastic process 
i
t w  in [3], 
with  [] 0 =
i
t w E ,  [ ]
2 2 ) ( i
i




tw w E  ∀ j≠ 0, characterizes a trade-related 
innovation that updates the market i’s information set. We allow 
D
t w  and 
F
t w  being 




t w w E ; this could be the case where the same 
informed investor or different traders endowed with the same privileged information 
trade simultaneously at different markets. For instance, Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) 
find that trade-related shocks across markets are correlated in high information periods. 
The parameter  i λ  measures how much of a trade-related shock is informative.  
The expectation based on the common information set (
*
t m ) follows a random 
walk process, 
t t t w m m + = − 1
* ,          [ 4 ]  
with wt being a zero-mean uncorrelated stochastic process representing an innovation in 
the common information set 
C




t w − = φ φ , due to a public disclosure at period 
t. Notice that equation [4] implies that any specific information given away at period t-







t φ φ φ ⊂ − − } , { 1 1 ). This imposes short-term convergence in expectations between both 
markets. Thus, 




t w w m m + + = − λ .           [ 5 ]  
Consequently, the revisions in the expectations about the true value of the stock 
have a common component (wt) and a market-specific component (
i
t iw λ ). For example, 
if 0 =
F
t w  and  0 ≠
D
t w  we have that  t t t
F
t w m m m + = = − 1
*  and  t
D
t m m = . That is, D has 
a more precise expectation at period t than F. In this scenery, F would behave as a pure 
satellite market if all the trade-related information were disseminated through the D’s 
trading activity (i.e.  0 = F λ ). We impose the restriction that the trade-related shocks are 
uncorrelated with the shocks motivated by public announcements:  [] 0 = − j t
i
tw w E , ∀ j.   7
Quotes are the result of the firm demand and offer positions by liquidity 
providers. In this paper, we average quotes using the quote midpoint of the bid-ask 






t b a q + = , where 
i
t a  and 
i
t b  represent the market i’s best ask and bid 
quotes. These quotes incorporate all the information revealed up to period t. The change 












t S m q + = ,           [ 6 ]  
where 
i
t S  satisfies that  0 ) ( =
i




t S S E σ = − ) (  ∀ k≥ 0 and ∀ i. Therefore, 
i
t S  is a 
covariance-stationary or weak-stationary stochastic component of quoted prices. It 





t S S −  depends on disparities in market-making costs, market frictions (like 
the tick size), and other specific features of the microstructures of both markets. 
Equation [6] implies that 
i
t q  is a non-stationary process since it depends on a long-run 
component (
*
t m ) that is integrated of order 1. This non-stationary component is 
common to both markets. Therefore, there exists a linear combination of their quotes 
that does is stationary, 












t S S w w q q − + − = − λ λ       [7] 
The difference between the quote midpoints is a stationary stochastic process, 
meaning that both prices are co-integrated with a theoretical co-integration vector [1, –
1]. The co-integration condition is necessary to avoid profitable arbitrage opportunities.
1  
Hereafter, we relax the assumption that public disclosures are not noisy signals. 
Hence, we allow for a second source of information asymmetries between markets: their 
respective ability to evaluate public signals. Public disclosures constitute imperfect 
information, in the sense that the valuable information is communicated with some 
distortion. A given market may have more capacity to identify useful information either 
because it more closely monitors the firm or because it has access to more complete 
information about the public signals. Therefore, markets differ in the quality of their 
                                                 
1 As an extreme case, consider that all public signals are first observed by the domestic market and 
transmitted to the foreign market with some lag. Let the market F’s quote be given by  F
t F t
F
t w m m λ + = − 1 , 
which explicitly indicates that the market F’s expectations at period t do not account for wt. Under this 




t S S − −  








t w w q q − − + + ≈ λ . Hence, also in this case, when  0 = F λ  the foreign market would 
be a pure satellite market for the cross-listed stock.   8
judgments. Kim and Verrecchia (1994) develop a model in which earning 
announcements provide information that may lead to different interpretations (see also 
Harris and Raviv, 1993). Some traders possess special capabilities that allow them to 
make (informed) judgments that are superior to the judgments of other traders. We just 
adapt Kim and Verrecchia’s framework here. Consider that the public signal is,  
t t t w w δ + = ~ ,           [ 8 ]  
where  t δ  is a stochastic process representing a distortion in the announcement, 
[]0 = t E δ ,  [ ]
2 2
δ σ δ = t E  and  [ ] 0 = − j t t E δ δ  ∀ j>0. We assume that  t δ  and wt are mutually 




t J ζ δ + = ,             [ 9 ]  
where 
i
t ζ  measures the information a market gleans about the random error by more 
closely studying the firm, its financial reports and businesses.
2 Let  [ ] 0 =
i




2 ) ( i
i




t E ζ ζ  ∀ j>0 and ∀ i. Again, we assume that  t δ  and 
i
t ζ  are 
mutually uncorrelated. The quality of the markets’ judgment depends on the precision 
of 
i
t J . When  0
2
, = i ζ σ  ∀ i, this specification is equivalent to [1]-[5]: the two markets 
perfectly isolate the noise ( t δ ) from the valuable information (wt). Hence, both markets 
adjust their expectations simultaneously and there are not disparities in their 
interpretations. It follows that, ceteris paribus, the market F’s behavior approximates 




, / F D ζ ζ σ σ  tends to zero. In this case, the judgments of 
the F agents are so imprecise that the update in their expectations (
F
t m ) is unreliable 
and, hence, transitory. We assume that the realization wt becomes public knowledge the 
period after the announcement. Therefore, public signals only provide a temporary 
advantage to the market with the most accurate information about the signal. In the 
period immediately after the signal, markets’ expectations will converge if there are no 
additional trade-related or trade-unrelated shocks. The market i’s expectations are 







t J w w m m − + + = λ .         [ 1 0 ]  
                                                 
2 An alternative specification would be to assume that the public announcement provides each market 
with a different signal. In this case, a market may be provided with an inferior signal than the other.   9
Let ρ  be the correlation coefficient between  ) ~ (
D
t t J w −  and  ) ~ (
F
t t J w − , such that 1≥ρ≥ 0. 
If ρ =1 both markets observe the same information and have the same posterior beliefs. 
If ρ =0 the two markets will have posterior fully heterogeneous beliefs. The common-
knowledge conditional expectation (
*









t D t t t w w w m m m λ λ . Notice that if  0
2
, ≠ i ζ σ  the change in the 
expectation of market i has a distorting component that will be corrected the next 
period. The co-integration result between D and F quote midpoints still holds for this 
alternative scenario.  
Thus far, only co-integration between quotes has been considered. However, 
other co-integration relationships can also emerge in this theoretical framework. Let the 





t w m x + ∆ + = ∆
*
0 γ γ .         [ 1 1 ]  
where 
i
t x ∆  is a stationary stochastic process representing the market i´s net trading 
activity in period t,  0 γ  is a constant term,
*
t
i m ∆ γ  is the predictable component of 
i
t x ∆  
given 
C
t φ  and 
i
t w  is the unexpected component of trading. A positive value of 
i
t x ∆  
implies more buyer-initiated trading than seller-initiated trading during that period. This 




t w ) 
as the unpredictable component of the net trading given the common information set 
(e.g., Subrahmanyam, 1997, and Kempf and Korn, 1999). Hence, we are assuming that 
i
t x  is the summation of current and previous impacts of both trade-related and trade-
unrelated informative shocks. It is straightforward to check that 
i
t x  (
i
t x ∆ ) is a non-
stationary (stationary) process. In addition, the trade-related shock could be decomposed 
into its informative component, 
i
t iw λ , and its uninformative one, 
i
t i w ) 1 ( λ − . This last 
component may be explained by the rational response of investors to market makers’ 
inventory control strategies or simply by noise trading (e.g., Hasbrouck, 1996). Since 
the trading processes 
F
t x  and 
D
t x  both depend on the same non-stationary long-run 
component, it would be possible to find a stationary linear combination. Indeed, in this 
simplified framework it would also be likely to find co-integration relationships 
between trades and quotes, all these meaning that the appropriate empirical counterpart 
to our framework is an error correction model. Next section develops our empirical 
specification.     10
3. The  empirical  model 
The most common efficient parameterization of a vector of co-integrated 
variables is, from the Granger’s Representation Theorem in Engle and Granger (1987), 
a VEC model. Equation [12] presents the standard error correction representation of 
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t q q q − − = ∆ .  The terms  ) ( ~ L
i
k Φ , for k and i ={D, F}, are autoregressive 
polynomials in the lag operator L (L
zyt = yt-z) having all their roots outside the unit 




t q q − − − β  is the normalized error correction term. 
Presumably, β  is equal to 1. The 
i α  term is the response of the market i to a divergence 
with the other market’s quotes. If both 
D α  and 
F α are statistically significant, this 
would evidence that we are facing a two-way price discovery process (see Harris et al., 




t u   u u =  in [12] 
include both the trade-related and the trade-unrelated shocks. Explicitly, let 
D












t w L w L u ε θ θ + + = ) ( ~ ) ( ~ ,        [ 1 3 ]  
where ) ( ~ L
i
k θ  are stationary lag polynomials. Equation [13] captures usual features of 
intra-daily data due to market frictions and specific trading rules. Because of market 
frictions, 
i
t q  may not instantaneously reproduce all the information trades release at 
period t.
3 Thus, the unexpected component of trades may have lagged effects on the 
quote midpoint (e.g., Hasbrouck, 1991a, and Pascual et al., 2003). The vector of trade-




t  ε ε ε =  incorporates the information inferred from public 
signals, (
D
t t J w − ~ ) and (
F
t t J w − ~ ) respectively, but also idiosyncratic features of each 
market that we do not model explicitly, like the tick size. If both markets have similar 
                                                 
3 The NYSE rules state that the specialist should maintain a fair and orderly market. This includes the 
responsibility of stabilizing prices in their assigned stocks. The specialist ensures that trading in the stocks 
moves smoothly throughout the day (e.g. Hasbrouck et al., 1993). In the SSE there is no specialist or 
figure alike. However, the existence of hidden orders and stopped orders may also delay the full 
revelation of the information behind trades. Alternatively, traders with heterogeneous priors and private 
information may take some intervals of trading to have their expectational differences resolved (e.g., 
Kyle, 1985).   11
abilities to judge public announcements, then 
D
t ε  and 
F
t ε  should be highly correlated. 




t E ε ε  due to a common factor. As to identify the components 
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where 
i
t x ∆  is the market i´s net trading activity at period t. All lag polynomials are 
stationary. At this point, let the generating process of 
D
t x ∆  (
F





















t w q L q L x L x L x + ∆ Π + ∆ Π + ∆ Π + ∆ Π = ∆ − − − − 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , [15] 
with  ) ( , L
i
k h Π , for h={x, q} and k={D, F}, being lag polynomials with all roots outside 
the unit circle. By substituting recursively the trading processes into [14], it is 
straightforward to see that [14]-[15] is equivalent to [12]-[13]. Notice that in [15] the 
trading process does not depend on the contemporaneous change in market quotes. This 
is because quotes and trades are not determined simultaneously: the quote revisions 
follow the net trading activity. The model allows causality running from lagged quote 
revisions to trades but not contemporaneously. This causality structure is very common 
among theoretical adverse selection costs models (e.g., Huang and Stoll, 1997).  
The model [14]-[15] is, however, incomplete. The theoretical framework in 
previous section allowed for multiple co-integration relationships. Indeed, in our four 









t t x x q q y       '=  which ensure that these variables converge to their long-run steady-
state. Presumably, one of these linear combinations must be the  ) 0    0    1    1 ( −  vector 
discussed earlier. Therefore, we end with an empirical model with 4 equations, with r≤ 3 
co-integrating vectors and with causality running from net trading to quotes, 
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k θ θ θ , k and i={D, F}.  
In the theoretical framework proposed in section 2 there were two differentiated 
sources of information: private information and public disclosures. Trade-unrelated 
shocks were made equal to public disclosures and trade-related shocks were made equal 
to private information. We must be cautious, however, when adopting the residuals of 
model [16] as a proxy for such innovations. It is a widespread practice in microstructure 
research to link the innovations in the trading process with new information (e.g., 
Hasbrouck, 1988; Huang and Stoll, 1997). As indicated by Madhavan et al. (1997) and 
Kempf and Korn (1999), the revision of beliefs depends on the unexpected order flow 
because, by definition, the predictable order flow conveys no additional information. In 
model [16], we decompose the order flow in its expected and unexpected components 
under the assumption that the expected component only (linearly) depends on the past 
quote and trade history of both D and F markets –the same assumption made in the 
theoretical framework. Once we have identified the trade-related shocks, the trade-
unrelated shocks are characterized as the trade-unrelated part of the quote revision 
innovation, as in Hasbrouck (1991a, 2002). These shocks are trade-unrelated because of 
the causality assumption in [16]. Therefore, we could identify all private information 








t  ε ε . In practice, however, this 
dichotomy is not so clear. On the one hand, in an order driven market quote revision 
innovations may reflect private information if informed traders submit limit orders 
instead of market orders. The usual claim is that informed traders prefer to submit 
market orders since their information is short lived and immediate execution is 
guaranteed (e.g., Angel, 1992, and Glosten, 1994). Nonetheless, Kaniel and Liu (2001) 
show that informed traders would prefer to submit limit orders when their information is 
long-lived or their valuation is close to the current market quotes. If the informed trader 
were patient, she would be more reluctant to submit large market orders since by doing 
so she would signal that the stock is mispriced. If she intends to execute an aggressive 
market order when her valuation is close to the current quotes, she would bear price 
risk. In a hybrid market, the quote revision innovations may reflect private information 
if either the market makers or the limit order traders possess superior information. Thus, 
Harris and Panchapagesan (2003) show that the main information advantage of the 
NYSE specialist is her privileged knowledge of the limit order book. On the other hand,   13
the assumption that trade innovations do not contain public information may be 
formalized as the requirement that public information is not useful in predicting the 
trade innovation. Under the conjecture that the relevant public information set is the 




t  w w  in [16] should be unpredictable given  1 − t φ . In 
practice, however, there are several reasons why this assumption may be violated. First, 
the relevant public information set might include other decision variables not explicitly 








t  w w  may indeed proxy for decision 
variables in the price discovery process or deterministic components that we have 
omitted. Second, Hasbrouck (1991a) claims that public information may affect posterior 
trading decisions when market imperfections or constraints impede quote revisions to 
fully reflect the public information, like price smoothing rules, verbal quotes in the 
crowd, stale limit orders etc. Indeed, limit orders in the crowd that are never 
disseminated off the floor could be considered as private rather than public information.  
These remarks evidence that the line that separates public and private 
information is thinner in empirical treatments than in theoretical ones. Therefore, some 
information effects could be erroneously attributed to public or private sources. 
Additionally, since D and F may have different microstructures, the relative 
transparency also plays a role. For the less transparent market, the thin line between 
public and private information will be even more imprecise. As a result, model [16] 
should be more precise in separating trade-inferred information and information 
gathered from other sources than in separating public and private information. Since our 
main concern is to determine how much of a change in the efficient price is related to 
the trading activity of each market, model [16] is a correct tool. Nonetheless, we must 
keep in mind that the estimated innovations will always be contingent on the linear 
autoregressive structure imposed in model [16].
4 
                                                 




t E ε ε  due to noisy public disclosures. 
Therefore, the empirical model is a system of seemingly unrelated equations that could be efficiently 
estimated by SURE (Zellner, 1962). In empirical applications, the correlation between the 
i
t ε  terms is 
expected to increase with the time interval used to define [16]. Consequently, if the time interval is short 
enough, the benefits of using SURE are mitigated. Second, Chiang and Lin (1999) show that the existence 
of a minimum price variation and the bid-ask bounce may induce a bias in the estimation of a VEC model 
using high-frequency transaction price data. However, the authors also show that by using quote 
midpoints this bias in considerably reduced.   14
4.  The information content of trades 
Hasbrouck (2002) confronts the information share approach in Hasbrouck 
(1995) with the permanent-transitory approach in Harris et al. (2002). He shows that in 
the case of a two markets model with private and public information, similar to the one 
presented in this paper, the information share approach is more reliable. The bound 
generated by the information share approach contains (up to estimation error) the true 
value. This cannot be said for the permanent-transitory approach. Therefore, we slightly 
modify the information share approach in Hasbrouck (1995) to differentiate between the 
information share that corresponds to each market’s trade-related and trade-unrelated 
information. 
Hasbrouck (1991b) defines the information content of the trading process as the 
variance of the expected impact of a trade innovation on the efficient price. In our case,  






t t x E x m E Var 1 | | − ∆ − ∆ ∆ φ .       [17] 




i w m E Var I | ∆ = .           [18] 
under the assumption that  t w , 
F
t w  and 
D
t w  are mutually uncorrelated, equation [18] is a 
proper absolute measure of the portion of the price discovery attributable to the trading 












= .         [ 1 9 ]  
Similar measures can be defined for the trade-unrelated shocks. 
Every VEC model has an associated common trend model representation 
implied by the co-integration relationships. The vector moving average (VMA) 
representation of [16] is,  
t t L y ξ ) ( Ψ = ∆ ,         [ 2 0 ]  





t t q q q ∆ ∆ = ∆    '  and  ) (L ψ  represent the first two rows in  ) (L Ψ . By recursive   15
substitution and using that  ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) (
* L L L ψ ψ ψ − + = , with 
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The first term on the RHS of [21] is the long-run (permanent) component, 
common to both quotes because of the theoretical co-integration relationship between 
quotes. The second term on the RHS of [21] is a zero-mean weakly stationary 
(transitory) component. Co-integration entails that  0 ) 1 ( ' = Ψ δ , where δ  is any co-
integration vector. Under the theoretical assumption that the difference between the 
market quotes is stationary,  ) 0    0    1    1 ( ' − = δ , we have that  ) 4 1 ( 2 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( x ψ ψ ψ = = , with 
) 1 ( k ψ  representing the k-th row in  ) 1 ( Ψ . Intuitively, the existence of a common long-
run component implies that the long-run impact of a new shock on either the foreign 
market or the domestic market should have the same permanent impact on both quotes. 
It follows that  t ψξ  measures the impact of a shock on the information efficient price. 
Let  ) 4 4 ( ) ( x t Var Ω = ξ . Then, the long-run variance would be given by 
' ) ( ψ ψ Ω = ∆ t m Var . Our aim is to identify the part of this long-run variance that is 
explained by each market’s information. Given the hypothesis of no correlation between 
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where  [] ()
2 2 | i w i
i
t t w m E Var σ ψ = ∆ and  i ψ  is the i-th component of the row vector ψ .  








t t w w       ' ε ε ξ =  are correlated, the covariance terms in 
Ω could be attributed to any shock. In this paper, we follow Hasbrouck (1995)’s 
suggestion of constructing upper and lower bounds for the information shares. 
Therefore, we orthogonalize the residual variance-covariance matrix using the Cholesky 
factorization and rotate the ordering of the variables to maximize and minimize the 
explanatory power of each particular shock. The Hasbrouck modeling framework is 
problematic where the contemporaneous correlation of shocks across markets is 
substantive. In that case, Huang (2002) and Booth et al. (2002) show wide gaps between 
the upper and lower bounds on the information shares. In our particular implementation,   16
a high frequency sampling may be required to reduce a substantive contemporaneous 
correlation of trade-related and/or trade-unrelated shocks across markets.   
5. Data 
In the next sections, we present an empirical application of our methodology 
using data on Spanish stocks listed in the NYSE as ADRs. We analyze the contribution 
of each market during the daily two-hour overlapping interval from 9:30 a.m. to 11:30 
a.m. (New York Time).
5 U.S. data are taken from the NYSE’s TAQ 2000 database. All 
quote and trade registers previous to the opening quote of the NYSE are dropped. 
Trades not codified as “regular trades” have been discarded. Trades performed at the 
same price, and with the same time stamp are treated as just one trade. Quotes with bid-
ask spreads lower than or equal to zero or quoted depth equal to zero have also been 
eliminated. Trades are classified as buyer or seller initiated trades using the Lee and 
Ready (1991) algorithm. Price and quote files are coupled using the so-called “five 
second rule”. This rule assigns to each trade the first quote stamped at least five seconds 
before the trade itself.
6 The Spanish data are supplied by Sociedad de Bolsas (SB), the 
organization that supervises the computerized Spanish Stock Exchange Interconnection 
System (SIBE). The SIBE is a pure order-driven market where the most liquid Spanish 
stocks trade and large trading volumes are handled efficiently and transparently. Since 
17 January 2000, SIBE operates in continuous trading between 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. 
(Spanish Time). The Spanish database includes a trade and a quote file. The quote file 
contains all the updates of the five best quotes on the bid and offer sides of the 
                                                 
5 Before 17 January 2000 continuous trading was from 9:30 to 17:00 ST; therefore, the overlapping 
trading period was just one hour and a half. Additionally, the beginning of the daylight saving time in 
October for Spain and US coincides. However, the end of this daylight saving time is the first Sunday of 
April in the US and the last Sunday of March in Spain. Hence, during the last week of March, the markets 
overlap only during one hour. 
6 Ellis et al. (2000) and Odders-White (2000) have compared alternative classification rules. Both papers 
find that the Lee and Ready’s algorithm outperform other classification routines like the quote rule and 
the tick rule. However, both papers found that the algorithm misclassifies transactions executed inside the 
quotes. Ellis et al. propose to apply the tick-rule not only to the midpoint trades, as in Lee and Ready’s 
algorithm, but also to all the trades inside the quotes. The authors show that, for Nasdaq-listed stocks, this 
procedure improves over extant classification rules. However, there is no test evidencing that this 
alternative method improves the classification for NYSE-listed stocks. We applied both algorithms and 
did not find remarkable differences. In any case, Odders-White observes that the biases introduced by the 
classification rules are more relevant for large and frequently traded stocks. Finally, Blume and Goldstein 
(1997) showed that the “five-seconds rule” could not be generalized to all sample periods and markets. 
However, Odders-White (op. cit) also shows that the “five-seconds rule” does not seem to explain much 
of the bias induced by the Lee and Ready’s algorithm.   17
electronic limit order book time stamped at the nearest hundredth of a second. The trade 
file includes detailed information about all trades. Due to the real time dissemination of 
all the information, there are no lags between the reporting time of the updated quotes 
and the transactions that triggered them. Trades are classified as buyer or seller initiated 
depending on the side of the book they hit. We transform the SSE quotes into US$ 
applying the corresponding intra-daily exchange rate series provided by Reuters. This 
series has a 1-minute resolution and contains the last exchange rate quoted each minute. 
The sample consists of the five Spanish NYSE-listed ADRs in 2000, discarding 
foreign subsidiaries and participated firms, with NYSE ticker symbols BBV, ELE, REP, 
SCH and TEF. These stocks are permanently among the 35 most liquid stocks in the 
SSE. They embody the 66% of the euro value of the 2000 SSE trading, 5% of the dollar 
value of the NYSE trading of European stocks, and less than 1% of the dollar value of 
all NYSE trading. These stocks became NYSE-listed before 1990 and an important part 
of their 2000 revenues come from their business activity in America.  
Informal conversations with NYSE specialists of non-US stocks suggest that the 
proper null hypothesis for our empirical exercise should be that the NYSE is a pure 
satellite of the SSE. A shared opinion among all them is that the contribution of the 
NYSE to the price-discovery process of ADRs depends, to a large extent, on the degree 
of development of the domestic market. When the home market is an illiquid, 
infrequently traded, immature market, the NYSE tends to lead or at least remarkably 
contribute. This is not the case of the SSE. Because the trading process concentrates on 
a small set of stocks, the SSE provides particularly high standards of liquidity and 
activity for the cross-listed stocks, in the framework of a technologically advanced and 
transparent system. Specialists also agree that, in the case of a strong domestic market, 
especially when it trades in a different time frame than the US markets, the specialist 
usually becomes a passive rather than an active player in price formation. Since the 
specialist’s liquidity provision for infrequently traded non-US stocks is expected to be 
crucial (Bacidore and Sofianos, 2000), we should also wait for NYSE quotes being 
hardly informative. Using Hasbrouck (1995) methodology, Grammig et al. (2004) and 
Hupperets et al. (2002) report empirical findings on two Dutch and two German NYSE-
listed ADRs, respectively, not necessarily supporting this view. Grammig et al. report 
1997-1998 NYSE information shares of 19.6% and 1% for SAP and DT. The NYSE 
volume shares for these stocks were 24% and 35%, respectively. Hupperets et al. report 
1999 average NYSE information shares of 6.5% and 9% for AHO and KPN, with 2.2% 
and 2.7% NYSE volume shares respectively.   18
A different issue, however, is whether the SSE traders may glean valuable 
information from NYSE trades even when the NYSE quotes are uninformative. In this 
case, a quote-based analysis could erroneously characterize the NYSE as a satellite of 
the SSE. In Table I–Panel A we report the trading-shares of both markets during the 
overlapping interval. If the SSE and the NYSE trades were equally informative, we 
would expect the trade-related information shares to be close to these trading shares. 
Notice the remarkable differences this panel reports between TEF and the other Spanish 
stocks.  
TABLE I. Activity during the overlapping interval 
Panel A: It reports the percentage of the trading activity of the Spanish cross-listed stocks during the overlapping period (15:30-
17:30 Spanish Time) that corresponds to the NYSE, both in terms of the volume traded (millions of shares) and trades (thousands). 
Panel B: It is indicative of the trading activity of the Spanish ADRs listed on the NYSE during the overlapping trading interval 
between the SSE and the NYSE. The overlapping interval has been divided into equally spaced time intervals from 1, 3 and 5 
minutes. The panel B.1 reports the percentage of intervals with at least one new quote register in the TAQ database. The panel B.2 
reports the percentage of intervals with at least one new trade register in the TAQ database. Panel C: It reports the empirical size 
distribution of the NYSE trades during the overlapping interval with respect to the 25%, 50%, 75%, 90%, 95% and 99% percentiles 
of the empirical size distribution of the SSE trades during the complete Spanish trading session (9:00-17:30 Spanish Time). Under 
the hypothesis of equality of both distributions, the expected values are 25%, 25%, 25%, 15%, 5%, 4% and 1%, respectively. 
 
In Table I-Panel B the overlapping period (9:30-11:30 NYT) is divided into 
equally spaced time intervals of 1, 3 and 5 minutes. Panel B.1 (B.2) shows the 
percentage of intervals with at least one new quote (trade) register in the TAQ database. 
This table shows that BBV is an infrequently traded stock at the NYSE; TEF can be 
Panel A: N Panel A: NYSE trading shares
Stock Volume Trades B.1. Quotes B.2. Trades
Total % NYSE Total % NYSE 1 min 3 min 5 min 1 min 3 min 5 min
BBV 519 1.35 208 2.07 18.71 40.03 54.28 11.73 27.92 39.97
ELE 283 3.08 166 4.17 29.69 60.07 77.45 18.84 45.6 63.68
REP 315 12.03 170 5.85 45.36 77.03 89 24.66 53.98 71.02
STD 710 2.8 247 3.48 31.06 61.33 78.02 21.05 47.23 64.18
TEF 1,795 23.23 651 5.93 74.19 96.28 98.52 61.82 90.23 96.3
Panel C: Size-Distribution of the NYSE trades during the overlapping*
Percentil <=25 25-50 50-75 75-90 90-95 95-99 >99 Obs.
BBV Buys 18.32 32.17 29.47 12.07 2.57 3.92 1.47 1632
Sells 17.55 27.35 36.48 12.41 2.75 2.29 1.16 2837
ELE Buys 27.95 26.91 25.05 11.87 3.41 3.51 1.31 3817
Sells 0.00 47.03 33.91 10.65 3.82 3.40 1.19 3117
REP Buys 13.91 13.43 27.66 20.58 8.95 9.16 6.31 4758
Sells 16.42 7.36 33.91 18.38 10.06 8.00 5.88 5190
STD Buys 28.06 27.34 25.14 10.78 3.17 3.26 2.24 4415
Sells 13.56 35.72 30.20 14.09 2.07 2.40 1.95 4202
TEF Buys 0.00 13.57 14.79 26.28 7.79 17.86 19.70 20732
Sells 0.00 14.87 21.55 20.84 10.90 17.51 14.32 4505
*Trade-size percentiles of reference: complete SSE trading session (9:00-17:30 ST). 
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considered as frequently traded; the remaining stocks are intermediate cases. Finally, 
Table I-Panel C reports the empirical distribution of the NYSE trade size during the 
overlapping interval with respect to the percentiles of the empirical distribution of the 
SSE trade size for the entire Spanish trading session. Observe that, for TEF and REP, 
the allocation of NYSE trades into the highest size-percentiles of the empirical 
distribution of the SSE trades is larger than expected under the hypothesis that both 
trade size distributions are equal. Therefore, NYSE trades for these stocks tend to be 
large in terms of the trade-size standards of the SSE. Additional analyses also reveal 
that the NYSE trade-size distribution does not change after the SSE closes. The NYSE 
specialists argue that US trades during the overlapping intervals usually hide large 
domestic investors trying to exploit profitable opportunities by trading simultaneously 
at both markets. Since the trades of these institutional traders may be particularly 
informative (Chakravarty, 2001), Spanish traders may obtain relevant information by 
monitoring the trading activity at the US market. Figure 1 reports the regular patterns in 
the intra-daily distribution of the standardized average number of trades per half-hour 
interval (Spanish Time). The standardized average share volume shows a similar 
pattern. Consistently with the institutional trading strategy suggested before, the SSE 
trading activity sharply increases as soon as the NYSE opens. During this period, SSE 
trades have the largest average size of all the Spanish session. After the SSE closes, the 
NYSE trading activity suddenly falls and only revives towards the end of the session. 
We construct time series for five different clock-time periodicities (from 1 to 5 
minutes). A change in quotes is computed as the difference between the logarithm of the 
quote midpoint at the end and at the beginning of each time interval. The trading 
process is represented either by the net share volume (NVt) or by the net number of 
trades (NTt) during each interval. We assume that indicators of net (signed) trading 
activity are more informative about the signed changes in market quotes than indicators 
of total volume traded. The NVt is defined as the difference between the buyer-initiated 
volume and the seller-initiated volume at the interval t. The NTt is defined as the 
difference between the number of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades. The trade 
indicator 
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FIGURE 1. Intra-daily distribution of trading activity 
 
Using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979), Phillips-Perron (1988) and the 
Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) tests, for all stocks and for all clock-time intervals, we accept 
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use the Johansen’s (1988, 1991, 1992) methodology to test how many co-integration 
vectors span the co-integration space. Tests for model specification are undertaken 
jointly with tests for co-integration rank. Regarding the model specification tests, we 
follow the so-called Pantula (1989) principle (see also Harris, 1995).
7 In all cases, the 
model selected has an intercept in the co-integration space, and it includes neither drifts 
nor linear trends in the short run part of the model. The intercept accounts for 
differences in the units of measurement of quotes and trading proxies. When we use NVt 
as the trading proxy, the trace statistic indicates r=3 co-integration vectors, for all stocks 
and for all time periodicities. Hence, in this model there is only one common trend 
determining the long-run steady state of all the variables in the system. When we take 
NTt, the co-integration rank is r=3 for two stocks (TEF and BBV) and r=2 for the 
others. Therefore, some stocks need a second common trend, apparently associated with 
the trading process, to guarantee convergence to the steady state.  
We carry out tests on α  and β  parameters in [16], using the Johansen 
methodology implemented in Cats for Rats. First, we check whether the last two rows 
of α  are zeros, meaning that there is no loss of information from not modeling the 
determinants of 
D
t x ∆  and 
F
t x ∆ , and it is therefore valid to proceed with a two-equation 
system. We strongly reject this weak exogeneity hypothesis for all stocks except 
F
t x ∆  
for REP and STD in the NTt model and only for some time-periodicities. Second, we 
test whether the  ) 0    0    1    1 ( −  vector defines one of the structural economic relationships 
underlying the long-run model. We accept this as a non-binding restriction for all stocks 
except for STD, but generally with a non-zero intercept, that is  *)    0    0    1    1 ( − . Possible 
explanations for this intercept are divergences between the market quotes due to market 
frictions (e.g., the tick size), inventory control by the NYSE specialist, or a less than 
accurate exchange rate time series. We also considered other theoretical co-integration 
vectors but we ended with mixed findings.
8 In the following sections, we report the 
                                                 
7 The “Pantula principle” consists in choosing the models with lowest rank and then the model with less 
deterministic components. We consider two alternative specifications: (a) Intercept in the co-integration 
space and no deterministic components in the short-run part. (b) Intercept in the short-run part and no 
deterministic components in the co-integration space. This second case is equivalent to a model with 
intercepts in both the long run and the short run. It is assumed, however, that the intercept in the co-
integration space is cancelled by the intercept in the short run. Other possible specifications have been 
discarded given the properties of our time series. 
8 Co-integration between  D
t x  and  F
t x  alone is a non-binding constraint for 4 stocks in the NVt model and 2 
stocks in the NTt model. Moreover,  i
t q  and  i
t x  are themselves co-integrated for 4 stocks in the NVt model 
and 3 stocks in the NTt model. The details of all the tests in this section are omitted because of the limited 
space, but they are available upon request. The estimation results for the models with an unrestricted and 
a fully identified β  are also available.   22
results for the VEC model with only the  *)    0    0    1    1 ( −  restriction in the long-run matrix 
β . Results with an unrestricted and a fully identified β  are identical, which is 
particularly important for STD since we impose the  *)    0    0    1    1 ( −  restriction.
  
6. Empirical  analysis 
6.1. Estimation  results 
This section summarizes the estimation of the VEC model [16] for the five 
Spanish cross-listed stocks. No overnight returns have been considered and no lags 
reached back to the previous day. When, for example, the optimal number of lags is 
four, the dependent vector begins with the fifth observation each overlapping interval. 
Table II reports the estimated model for TEF with the 1-minute time series when NTt 
proxies for trading activity. The estimated model with NVt is very similar. The lag-
length is 3. There are 3 co-integration vectors and the first one is  *)    0    0    1    1 ( − . We also 
report the residual correlation matrix and the Breusch and Pagan (1980) chi-square test 
for independence. The model is estimated by SURE using the FGLS algorithm (e.g., 
Green, 1997, pg. 511-513). The estimation results are consistent across stocks and the 
main findings derived are independent of the clock-time interval and the trading proxy 
used. 
The identified error correction term (ECT1) in the two quote equations is 
statistically significant for all stocks and specifications, and the sign of the coefficient is 
the expected one. If there is a movement in either the NYSE or the SSE away from the 
long-run equilibrium in a given period, a proportion of the disequilibrium is corrected 




t q q  the next period 
S
t q ∆  will decrease and 
NY
t q ∆  
will increase, rectifying (at least partially) the deviation between both markets. As the 
SSE quotes also respond to deviations from the NYSE quotes, this result suggests that 
the price discovery process may be not completely driven by the Spanish market. 




t q q  then 
S
t x ∆  decreases (larger sell pressure) and 
NY
t x ∆  
increases (larger buy pressure), which forces quotes to move towards convergence. The 
magnitude of the coefficient associated to the ECT1 of the 
S
t q ∆  equation (
S
t α ) is always 
smaller in absolute terms than the coefficient associated to the ECT of the 
NY
t q ∆  
equation (
NY




t α α >  cannot be rejected   23
at the 1% level. Therefore, the reaction of the NYSE to the price differentials is faster 
and larger than that of the SSE. 
TABLE II. Estimation of the VEC model 
This table reports the estimated coefficients of the VEC model [16] for TEF. The overlapping trading interval between the SSE and 
the NYSE is divided in 1-minute intervals. For the definition of the variables, see section 5 in the paper. The lag length has been 
determined using the AIC information criterion. We report the coefficients of the VEC model that uses the transformation [23] of 
the net number of trades as the proxy for trading activity. The net number of trades is the difference between the number of buyer-
initiated trades and the number of seller-initiated trades executed during the corresponding time interval. The first co-integration 
vector (ECT1) is restricted to be (1 –1 0 0). We also report the residual correlation matrix with the Breusch and Pagan (1980) chi-
square test for independence and the normalized co-integration vectors. 
 















Examining the coefficients of the lagged values of 
S
t q ∆  and 
NY
t q ∆  on the quote 
equations we observe, on the one hand, a significant negative autocorrelation in quotes. 
This could reflect the correction process that starts after an uninformative shock beats 





ECT 1 (t-1) -0.0167* 0.0968* -0.00049* 0.00045*
ECT 2 (t-1) 0.00019* 0.0009* -0.00007* -6.03E-06*
ECT 3 (t-1) 0.00047* -0.0001 -0.00005* 2.20E-06
∆ q
S (t-1) -0.1477* 0.1221* 0.00451* 0.00074*
∆ q
S (t-2) -0.0613* 0.1090* -0.0012 0.00044*
∆ q
S (t-3) -0.0102* 0.0718* 0.0008* 0.00024*
∆ q
NY (t-1) -0.0002 -0.3146* 0.0003 -0.0019*
∆ q
NY (t-2) 0.0028 -0.1392* 0.0001 -0.00089*
∆ q
NY (t-3) 0.0042 -0.0566* -0.0007 -0.00031*
∆ x
S (t) 3.3233* 0.5643*
∆ x
S (t-1) 0.13031* 0.9552* 0.2669* 0.0079*
∆ x
S (t-2) -0.4282* 0.2088* 0.1060* 0.0041*
∆ x
S (t-3) 0.0004 -0.0123* 0.0003 -0.0001
∆ x
NY (t) 0.8787* 6.4607*
∆ x
NY (t-1) 0.3885* 2.974* 0.0958* 0.0534*
∆ x
NY (t-2) 0.2705 0.8544* 0.0005 0.0234*
∆ x
NY (t-3) -0.0136 0.2306** 0.0087 -0.0010
R
2 0.1732 0.203 0.1446 0.0328



















ECT 1 1 -1 0 0
ECT 2 1 0.9651 0.3214 -4.265






Correlation matrix of residuals
Breusch-Pagan test: chi
2(6) = 80.793, P-value = 0.0000  24
the quotes. On the other hand, there is a significant positive effect of the lagged 
S
t q ∆  
values on the 
NY
t q ∆  equation, reflecting co-movements of both quotes led by the SSE. 
The opposite relationship is also true for TEF for almost all time intervals: the lagged 
values of 
NY
t q ∆ also affect positively to 
S





j S , , φ φ , that is, 
NY
t q ∆  is more sensitive to changes in the lagged values of 
S
t q ∆  than the other way around. The trading activity has a strong positive effect on 
quotes, independently of the proxy used. Table II evidences that an increase in NTt 
either at the SSE or at the NYSE produces an upward adjustment of both quotes. This 
finding indicates that the trading activity at the NYSE provides some information to 
both markets, even when the trading activity at the SSE has been taken into account. For 
the other stocks in the sample, the significance of the effect of the NYSE trading 
activity on 
S
t q ∆  depends on the time interval considered. 
The estimated coefficients for the trade equations report both an expected and an 
unexpected finding. On the one hand, there is a strong positive autocorrelation in 
i
t x ∆  
independently of the proxy used (e.g., Hasbrouck, 1991a). Additionally, we find 
evidence of clusters of signed trading activity between the SSE and the NYSE, 
generally led by the Spanish market: positive lagged values of 
S
t x ∆  are followed by 
positive values in 
NY
t x ∆ . This result suggests trading transmission between markets. For 
the most frequently traded stocks at the NYSE (TEF and REP) we also found evidence 
of trading transmission from the NYSE to the SSE. On the other hand, positive lagged 
values of 
S
t q ∆  increase both 
NY
t x ∆  and 
S
t x ∆ . That is, after an upward revision in the 
SSE quotes, both markets experiment a larger pressure to buy. However, and this is the 
unexpected finding, for the NYSE we obtain the opposite effect. Lagged positive values 
of 
NY
t q ∆ , increase the NYSE pressure to sell (decreases 
NY
t x ). This relationship is not 
observed for the SSE trading activity. Hence, our explanation is that this result captures 
the marginal effect of inventory control by the NYSE specialist. Periods of intense 
demand ( 0 >
NY
t x ) are linked to increases in the value of the stock ( ) 0 > ∆
NY
t q , as we 
have observed before. During these periods, the NYSE specialist will be forced to 
provide liquidity in order to maintain stable market conditions. This is especially true 
for infrequently traded stocks (Madhavan and Sofianos, 1998) and non-US stocks 
(Bacidore and Sofianos, 2000). As a consequence, the specialist could be forced to hold 
an undesired negative inventory position in the cross-listed stock. During the next 
period, the specialist will try to motivate traders to introduce market orders to sell in   25
order to restate their preferred inventory position. This is also consistent with the 
negative autocorrelation of 
NY
t q ∆ discussed before. 
Previous results suggest that, as expected, the SSE leads the price discovery 
process of the Spanish cross-listed stocks. Unfortunately, whether the SSE trading 
activity accounts for an important part of the SSE contribution, whether the NYSE 
quotes are a factor in the price discovery process and whether the US trading activity is 
informative, are questions that cannot be answered through the estimation results alone. 
This is the aim of the next section. 
6.2.  Information shares. General findings 
Table II reports the residual correlation matrix for the VEC model [16] estimated 
using TEF data and with a 1-minute resolution. Because of the causality assumption, 
trade-related and trade-unrelated noises are uncorrelated. Additionally, 
S
t ε  and 
NY
t ε  are 
slightly but significantly correlated. Of course, this correlation increases with time 
aggregation. Similarly, 
S
t w    and 
NY
t w   are also significantly correlated, suggesting 
common shocks in the trading process. This correlation also increases, but less, with 
time aggregation. Therefore, we expect the information share bounds described in 
section 4 to be tighter as we decrease time aggregation. This matrix also indicates that 
the scenario with noisy trade-unrelated shocks described in section 2 might be a proper 
characterization of the underlying price discovery process: the simultaneous trade-
unrelated shocks are not perfectly correlated, suggesting that both markets may differ in 
their ability to judge noisy public disclosures.  
We derive the VMA representation of the VEC model [16] directly from the 
estimated VEC model following Watson (1994). The changes in the US$/€ exchange 
rate might cause some distortions in the computation of the information shares. 
However, Lieberman et al. (1999) conclude that the correlation between the changes in 
quotes and the changes in the exchange rates is irrelevant. Moreover, Grammig et al. 
(2004) find that the exchange rate is not a relevant determinant in price discovery. 
Therefore, we assume that any bias induced by shocks in the exchange rate is negligible. 
Table III-Panel A contains the lower and upper bounds of the information shares for the 
1-minute resolution.   26
TABLE III. Information shares during the overlapping interval 
This table contains the information shares (in %) for trade-related and trade-unrelated shocks originated at the NYSE and at the 
SSE. The information share is the proportion of variance in the efficient price that is attributable to a given innovation, either trade-
related (w
S, w
NY) or trade-unrelated (ε
S, ε
NY). The table provides the lower bound and the upper bounds (in parenthesis) based on the 




The SSE is, as we expected, the leading market in the price discovery process of 
the five Spanish cross-listed stocks during the overlapping interval. The information 
shares for the SSE trade-unrelated informational shocks (
S
t ε ) are between 62% and 85% 
depending on the stock and the trading measure. Table III also indicates that the 
contribution of the NYSE trade-unrelated shocks (
NY
t ε ) is negligible for all stocks. Only 
TEF and REP, with a 6.3%-6.6% and 4.1%-4.9% of the variance of the efficient price 
explained by the NYSE trade-unrelated shocks, might generate some sort of doubt about 
its statistical significance. Even in this case, the contribution is marginal. For the 
remaining stocks, the 
NY
t ε  contribution approaches zero. In the context of the scenario 
proposed in section 2, these results suggest that the SSE generally does judgments about 
public disclosures that are more precise and disseminates this information quicker than 






















Panel A: Model [16]
NV 82.1 1.0 16.5 0.1 85.0 2.3 12.2 0.2 78.4 4.1 16.7 0.4 83.1 0.9 15.9 0.1 68.8 6.3 20.3 1.9
(82.3) (1.2) (16.6) (0.2) (85.3) (2.6) (12.2) (0.2) (78.7) (4.4) (16.8) (0.4) (83.1) (0.9) (15.9) (0.1) (71.1) (8.6) (20.7) (2.3)
NT 77.2 0.0 22.7 0.0 78.9 2.2 18.6 0.0 69.6 4.9 24.9 0.2 76.2 0.7 23.0 0.0 61.9 6.6 28.4 0.9
(77.2) (0.0) (22.7) (0.1) (79.2) (2.4) (18.6) (0.0) (69.9) (5.2) (25.0) (0.2) (76.2) (0.7) (23.0) (0.0) (63.9) (8.6) (28.7) (1.2)
Panel B: Model [16] with no-trading dummies
NV 82.2 1.1 16.3 0.2 84.9 2.3 12.2 0.2 78.4 4.2 16.7 0.4 83.1 0.9 15.9 0.1 68.8 6.2 20.3 1.9
(82.4) (1.2) (16.4) (0.2) (85.2) (2.6) (12.3) (0.2) (78.6) (4.5) (16.8) (0.5) (83.1) (0.9) (15.9) (0.1) (71.2) (8.6) (20.7) (2.4)
NT 76.5 0.8 22.5 0.1 78.9 2.2 18.6 0.0 68.8 5.0 25.6 0.2 76.2 0.7 23.0 0.0 61.8 6.6 28.4 0.9
(76.6) (0.8) (22.5) (0.1) (79.2) (2.4) (18.6) (0.0) (69.2) (5.3) (25.7) (0.2) (76.2) (0.7) (23.0) (0.0) (63.9) (8.6) (28.7) (1.2)
Panel C: Model [16] with overnight information 
NV 81.9 1.1 16.5 0.2 84.5 2.7 12.2 0.3 78.4 4.1 16.7 0.4 83.1 0.8 16.0 0.1 68.6 6.2 20.5 1.9
(82.1) (1.3) (16.6) (0.2) (84.8) (3.0) (12.2) (0.3) (78.7) (4.4) (16.8) (0.5) (83.1) (0.9) (16.0) (0.1) (71.0) (8.6) (20.9) (2.4)
NT 77.3 0.0 22.7 0.0 78.5 2.6 18.5 0.0 68.7 5.5 25.1 0.3 74.9 0.7 24.4 0.0 63.4 5.5 28.1 0.8
(77.3) (0.0) (22.7) (0.1) (78.8) (2.9) (18.5) (0.0) (69.0) (5.8) (25.2) (0.4) (74.9) (0.8) (24.4) (0.0) (65.3) (7.3) (28.4) (1.1)
Panel D: Model [16] with medium-sized and large-sized trades
NV 79.5 1.5 18.6 0.2 77.3 3.8 18.3 0.4 71.9 5.7 21.4 0.7 82.4 0.0 17.6 0.0 54.4 13.2 24.5 3.6
(79.7) (1.7) (18.6) (0.3) (77.5) (4.0) (18.4) (0.4) (72.1) (5.9) (21.5) (0.8) (82.4) (0.0) (17.6) (0.0) (58.0) (16.8) (25.2) (4.4)
NT 73.0 1.3 25.5 0.0 78.3 3.1 18.3 0.0 66.4 5.7 27.2 0.5 74.3 0.8 24.9 0.0 46.6 15.3 33.0 1.4
(73.2) (1.5) (25.5) (0.0) (78.6) (3.4) (18.3) (0.0) (66.7) (6.0) (27.2) (0.4) (74.3) (0.8) (24.9) (0.0) (49.8) (18.5) (33.5) (1.9)
Panel E: Model [16] with medium-sized trades (stealth trading)
NV 86.6 1.7 11.4 0.1 82.4 4.5 12.7 0.1 80.1 5.2 14.1 0.3 89.4 1.4 9.1 0.0 55.3 17.7 19.0 2.7
(86.8) (1.9) (11.4) (0.1) (82.7) (4.7) (12.7) (0.1) (80.4) (5.5) (14.1) (0.3) (89.5) (1.5) (9.1) (0.0) (60.3) (22.6) (19.4) (3.0)
NT 82.2 2.0 15.5 0.1 74.7 3.9 21.1 0.1 72.6 5.8 21.3 0.0 84.1 0.8 15.0 0.0 56.8 16.4 21.2 1.0
(82.5) (2.2) (15.5) (0.1) (74.9) (4.2) (21.1) (0.1) (72.9) (6.2) (21.3) (0.0) (84.2) (0.8) (15.1) (0.0) (61.1) (20.7) (21.5) (1.2)
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have some advantage over the SSE in processing some particular event, probably news 
that concern the American investments of these firms, their industries in general, or the 
US economy in particular. 
The trade-related informational shares show a completely different picture. On 
the one hand, for the 1-minute resolution the SSE trade-related shocks (
S
t w ) explain 
between 12.2% and 28.4% of the long-term variance of the Spanish cross-listed stocks, 
again depending on the stock and trading measure. The information share for the NYSE 
trade-related shocks (
NY
t w ), however, is less than 1% in almost all the cases. We define 
the NYSE relative trade-related informational share (RTRIS) as the trade-related 
information share of the NYSE over the sum of all the information shares attributed to 







NY w IS w IS w IS RTRIS + = . If we compare 
this measure with the “trading shares” in Table I, the conclusion must be that the NYSE 
trading activity has no information content: 23% of TEF and 12.03% of REP traded 
volume takes place at the NYSE. However, the corresponding RTRIS are almost zero. 
Similar results are obtained with the number of trades.  
6.3. Refinements   
In this subsection, we discuss some refinements of the empirical model [16] that 
provide new insights into the price discovery process of the Spanish cross-listed stocks. 
Table III reports the information shares for some of these “improved” model 
specifications.
9  
Intra-daily patterns: Figure 1 evidenced deterministic patterns in trading activity 
during the overlapping trading interval between the NYSE and the SSE. Since trading 
patterns may signal regular information flow changes, the information shares may 
conditionally change over time. We divide the overlapping period in three intervals and 
repeat the preceding analysis for each of them. The first period (15:30-16:00 ST) 
encloses the opening of the NYSE and the third period (17:00-17:30 ST) comprises the 
close of the SSE. We find that the contribution of the NYSE is not uniform during the 
overlapping period. As the close of the SSE approaches, the NYSE clearly becomes a 
pure satellite. Indeed, for TEF the NYSE information shares are zero in almost all cases.  
No-trading periods: The measures of net (signed) trading activity we use to 
represent the trading process do not differentiate between zeros due to no trading and 
                                                 
9 Tables with detailed estimation results are available upon request from the authors.   28
zeros due to an equilibrium between buyer and seller initiated trading. The information 
content of a without-trading period, however, may differ from that of a with-trading 
period, either balanced or not (e.g., Easley and O’Hara, 1992). In our sample, zeros in 
NVt are mainly due to no-trading periods (95% SSE, 99% NYSE). Zeros in NTt are due 
to balanced trading for the SSE (52%-89%) and no trading for the NYSE (80-98%). Of 
course, the proportion of zeros in either trade proxy is much larger for the NYSE than 
for the SSE. These differences might introduce some sort of bias in the computation of 
the information shares. To deal with this problem, we add no-trading dummy variables 
to model [16]. The NYSE (SSE) dummy equals 1 whenever there is a contemporaneous 
no-trading zero in the NYSE (SSE) trading proxy and 0 otherwise. Table III-Panel B 
provides the information shares. To sum up, we do not find any remarkable difference 
with the results reported before, suggesting that, in our sample, no-trading periods 
provide the same information than balanced periods.  
Overnight information: In model [16], we are assuming that nothing significant 
to the model has happened in the 22 hours between the close of the SSE and the opening 
of the NYSE the next day. Namely, we are implicitly imposing that NYSE opening 
residuals do not serially depend on the information revealed during the last 22 hours. 
There are several reasons to think this could be the case. Prior the NYSE opens, the SSE 
has been trading during 6½ hours. This period may suffice to incorporate all the public 
information revealed during the market closure in New York or during the overnight 
period. Indeed, we would expect the initial NYSE shocks to reflect new information not 
revealed during the first 6½ hours of trading in Spain. The sudden drop in the SSE 
activity just before the NYSE opens (see Figure 1), suggests that Spanish traders are 
expecting new information to be revealed with the opening of the US market. In this 
case, the initial residuals of the NYSE continuous-trading session would be uncorrelated 
with public disclosures during the non-overlapping period. We empirically evaluate the 
impact of the overnight information and the 6½ hours of price discovery in Spain on the 
information shares by adding additional exogenous variables to model [16]. For each 
trading day d, we compute the return, net volume, and net number of trades in New 
York between 17:30(d-1) (SSE closes) and 22:00(d-1) (NYSE closes), and in Spain 
between 9:00(d) a.m. (SSE opens) and 15:30(d) (NYSE opens). We also obtain the 
overnight returns between 22:00(d-1) and 9:00(d) a.m. Then, we construct seven time 
series indicators that equal the daily value of the corresponding variable for the first half 
hour of the overlapping interval and 0 otherwise. There is only one systematic empirical 
pattern across stocks: the SSE returns during the 6½ hours preceding the NYSE opening 
are positively correlated with the initial NYSE trade-unrelated shocks. Despite that, 
Table III-Panel C evidences that the information shares for this model specification do 
not remarkably differ from those reported in previous panels.   29
Alternative trading measures: Despite the fact that the main conclusions do not 
vary, Table III - Panels A to C evidence that the information shares may depend on the 
trading proxy used in model [16]. Indeed, microstructure research suggests alternative 
and, a priori, equally acceptable trading proxies. In several competitive and strategic 
asymmetric information models, the size of trades is positively related with the quality 
or precision of the information possessed by informed traders (e.g., Easley and O’Hara, 
1987; Kim and Verrecchia, 1991; Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992). In contrast, 
Barclay and Warner (1993) and Chakravarty (2001), provide evidence supporting the 
so-called stealth-trading hypothesis, that privately informed traders concentrate their 
trades in medium sizes to camouflage their positions so that most of a stock’s 
cumulative price change will take place on medium-size trades. If every informed trader 
focuses on medium and large sizes, including small-sized trades in the NVt and NTt 
trading measures adds an unnecessary uninformative noise. What is more, when the 
stealth-trading hypothesis is true even large-sized trades could be discarded. Table III 
reports the information shares of model [16] when NVt and NTt are computed using all 
trades but the small-sized ones (Panel D) and just medium-sized trades (Panel E). All 
trades with size lower than or equal to (larger than) the 25% (75%) percentile of the 
empirical distribution of the trade size for each particular stock are classified as small-
sized (larger-sized) trades. Panel D shows that, when small-sized orders are discarded, 
the NYSE trade-unrelated information share for TEF remarkably increases. When the 
largest trades are eliminated, the NYSE contribution augments and additional 2-4% in 
this stock. Therefore, under the assumption that the stealth-trading hypothesis applies, 
the NYSE cannot be considered as a pure satellite market of the SSE during the 
overlapping interval for the most frequently traded cross-listed stock. Nonetheless, this 
US contribution is absolutely trade-unrelated.  
Liquidity shocks: As discussed earlier, trade-related and trade-unrelated shocks 
in model [16] may be affected by omitted endogenous decision variables. A solid 
candidate is liquidity. As far as liquidity varies over time, it affects trading costs, 
volatility and encourages strategic behavior by traders.
10 In this paper, we use net depth 
to measure liquidity. Recently, Chakravarty et al. (2001) have shown that depths rather 
                                                 
10 Handa and Schwartz (1996), Parlour (1998) and Foucault (1999) propose models where the state of the 
limit order book influences the order flow composition. In these models an unbalanced limit order book 
reflects the market sentiment. Similarly, Huang and Stoll (1994) claim that the asymmetric depth reflects 
information asymmetries. Seppi (1997) and Kaniel and Liu (2001) theoretically show that, contrary to the 
usual claim, informed traders would prefer to submit limit orders rather than market orders under certain 
conditions. Empirically, Harris and Panchapagesan (2003), Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000), 
Corwin and Lipson (2000) and Coppejans and Domowitz (2002), among others, provide evidence on the 
information content of the limit order book.   30
than spreads are first to impound new information that leads to new quote trends. 
Moreover, Coppejans et al. (2001) evidence that positive depth shocks on the offer (bid) 
side of the market tend to lower (raise) returns. Since both liquidity traders and 
informed traders may submit limit orders, the dynamics of the size quotes have an 
informative and an uninformative component. The market i’s depth process (
i
t d ) can be 




t m d κ π + ∆ = ∆
* , with 
i
t κ  being the unpredictable component of liquidity given the 
common information set. Table IV shows the information shares for a six-equation VEC 
model with trade-related shocks and liquidity-related shocks as measured by net 
depth.
11 In summary, liquidity-shocks play a negligible role in the price-discovery 
process of the Spanish ADRs, independently of trading proxy used. In line with 
Coppejans and Domowitz (1999), our results suggest that liquidity-shocks are not 
informative once we control for trade-related information. 
 
In summary, the NYSE is a pure satellite market of the SSE at least for four of 
the five Spanish cross-listed stocks. The information content of the trading activity in 
the US market is negligible for all stocks (λ F≈ 0). Only for the most frequently traded 
stock and under the assumption that all the informed trades concentrate in medium sizes 
(stealth trading) or medium and large sizes, the NYSE trade-unrelated contribution is 
noticeable.  
                                                 
11 Model [16] is expanded to incorporate the depth processes so that we consider a six-equation model. 
We maintain the causal relationship from trades to quotes and we add causality from depth to trades and 
quotes. Intuitively, depth is a function of the bids and offers, the result of submitting passive limit orders 
to the system. These orders naturally precede transactions. In addition, since limit orders may transmit 
information by their own, they may also cause quote adjustments even without trading activity. The depth 
proxy for each market is the net depth at the best quotes weighted by time. We apply the transformation 
[23] to get ∆ d
i
t. The series in levels d
i
t is computed by accumulation of the series in first differences. The 




t) is a unit root (stationary) process for both markets and for all stocks. 
Details about model specification tests and estimation results are available upon request.   31
TABLE IV. Information shares with liquidity shocks 
This table contains the estimated information shares (in %) for trade-related, liquidity-related and trade-and-liquidity-unrelated 
shocks originated at the NYSE and the SSE. The information share is the proportion of variance in the efficient price of the stock 




NY) or trade-and-liquidity-unrelated (ε
S, 
ε
NY). The table provides the lower bound and the upper bounds (in parenthesis) based on the estimation of the VEC model [16], 




This paper studies the price discovery process of cross-listed securities during 
the period when the different markets simultaneously trade (their trading sessions 
overlap). Building on Hasbrouck (1995) information share approach, we have 
introduced a methodology that distinguishes two sources of information asymmetries 
between markets: trade-related and trade-unrelated information. By separating the quote 
innovations into trade-related and trade-unrelated shocks, we are able to decompose the 
global information share of each market into its trade-related and trade-unrelated 
components. By modeling the trading processes of the different markets, we also allow 
for incremental information contained in trade shocks, beyond that reflected in each 
market’s quotes. This approach improves on previous empirical methodologies in 
several ways: it considers other pieces of information than the market quotes; it 
provides a more accurate characterization of a dominant-satellite relationship when it 
exists; it accounts for alternative sources of information provision and, therefore, 
information asymmetries; it allows to evaluate the information content of the trading 
process of each market; and it is flexible enough as to accommodate further extensions, 
like introducing liquidity shocks.   
As an empirical application of this methodology, we studied the contribution of 














BBV 78.47 1.81 18.79 0.29 0.30 0.03 71.83 1.84 25.43 0.16 0.46 0.01
(78.70) (2.04) (18.87) (0.37) (0.30) (0.03) (72.08) (2.09) (25.45) (0.18) (0.46) (0.01)
ELE 82.23 2.22 14.21 0.20 0.86 0.00 77.27 2.23 19.45 0.02 0.76 0.04
(82.50) (2.49) (14.22) (0.21) (0.86) (0.00) (77.51) (2.47) (19.44) (0.02) (0.76) (0.04)
REP 78.47 3.87 15.90 0.18 1.29 0.00 70.10 3.90 24.29 0.03 1.37 0.00
(78.73) (4.13) (15.92) (0.20) (1.30) (0.00) (70.41) (4.21) (24.30) (0.04) (1.37) (0.00)
STD 83.46 1.24 15.16 0.06 0.05 0.00 76.38 0.99 22.54 0.00 0.02 0.00
(83.48) (1.27) (15.16) (0.07) (0.05) (0.00) (76.45) (1.06) (22.54) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
TEF 65.04 6.48 21.56 1.86 0.60 1.72 57.95 6.54 29.73 1.04 0.57 1.74
(67.29) (8.73) (22.06) (2.37) (0.59) (1.72) (59.98) (8.57) (30.13) (1.44) (0.57) (1.74)
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centered on the daily overlapping trading interval between both the NYSE and the SSE. 
Not surprisingly, our results indicate that the SSE leads the price discovery. The SSE 
trade-related shocks account for 12% to 30% of the long-run variance of the Spanish 
cross-listed stocks. NYSE trade-related shares, however, are undistinguishable from 
zero. Indeed, the NYSE global contribution is negligible. Only for the most frequently 
traded stock and under the assumption that only medium and large sized trades are 
informative, the NYSE trade-unrelated shocks account for 15-17% of the price-
discovery process.    33
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